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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses and deconstructs the transhumanist commit-
ment to animal rights and the well-being of all sentient beings. Some 
transhumanists have argued that such a commitment entails a moral 
imperative to help non-human animals overcome their biological 
limitations by enhancing their cognitive abilities and generally “up-
lifting” them to a more human-like existence. I argue that the trans-
humanist approach to animal welfare ultimately aims at the destruc-
tion of the animal as an animal. By seeking to make animals more 
like us the freedom to live their life as the kind of creature they are 
is being denied to them. It is an attempt to tame the beast, to make 
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In many respects transhumanists, who advocate the use of 
new technologies to overcome our human condition, are hu-
manists. However, they do not usually believe that humans 
are the only beings worthy of moral consideration, the only 
ones that have true moral standing. In other words, they do not 
subscribe to the kind of ethical humanism that characterised 
the philosophy of, for instance, Thomas Aquinas or Immanuel 
Kant. Instead, most transhumanists follow the utilitarian tradi-
tion, which emphasises the ability to suffer as a normatively 
relevant common ground between humans and animals. Since 
animals are sentient creatures, they do deserve at least some 
moral recognition. Thus David Pearce, author of the transhu-
manist manifesto The Hedonistic Imperative, in which he ar-
gues for the biotechnological abolition of all suffering, includ-
ing that of nonhuman animals (Pearce 1995), states that from 
“a notional God’s-eye perspective, I’d argue that morally we 
should care just as much about the abuse of functionally equiv-
alent non-human animals as we do about members of our own 
species — about the abuse and killing of a pig as we do about 
the abuse or killing of a human toddler.” (Pearce 2007). Along 
the same lines, the Transhumanist Declaration, crafted in 1998 
by Nick Bostrom, David Pearce, Max More, and others, and 
later officially adopted by the world transhumanist association 
Humanity Plus, explicitly commits transhumanists to the ad-
vocacy of “the well-being of all sentience, including humans, 
non-human animals, and any future artificial intellects, modi-
fied life forms, or other intelligences to which technological 
and scientific advance may give rise.” (Humanity Plus 1998). 
Other transhumanists emphasize the fact that at least some 
nonhuman animals qualify as (Lockean) persons, and demand 
that human-level legal rights be conferred to them (or in gen-
eral to all “non-human persons”, which of course also includes, 
or would include, intelligent, self-aware machines). Under the 
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leadership of George Dvorsky, the Institute for Ethics and 
Emerging Technologies promotes a “Rights of Non-Human 
Persons” program, which aims at defending “the rights of non-
human persons to live in liberty, free from undue confinement, 
slavery, torture, experimentation, and the threat of unnatural 
death. (ieet.org)
However, transhumanists still believe that only humans pos-
sess the ability to self-transform under the guidance of reason 
and in accordance with goals derived from a rational assessment 
of what matters in life and what is objectively good and worth 
having and being. We alone can make that assessment, and we 
alone can use our insight to redesign a suboptimal world, which 
includes redesigning our suboptimal selves, as well as those of 
others. This is our main obligation, our mission on earth. Non-
human animals cannot take on that mission because even the 
most intelligent animals are stuck in the natural world, forever 
confined to the specific bodies and minds that they have been 
given by nature, condemned to accept their various inabilities: 
their comparative lack of understanding, the shortness of their 
lives, the inevitability of their deaths, because they have no 
choice in the matter. But we do. Our ability to reason makes 
a huge difference. While it does not make us autonomous, it 
gives us the potential to free ourselves from the confinements 
of nature. Just like nonhuman animals we are currently still 
“slaves to our genes” and subject to “the tyranny of aging and 
death” (More 2013, 450), but at least we have a good fighting 
chance to pull free of all that if we only put our mind (and its 
offshoot, science and technology) to it. To finally take up that 
fight in earnest is what transhumanists urge us to do. Thus Max 
More, in a “Letter to Mother Nature,” which starts with an ac-
knowledgement of “the many wonderful qualities” that Nature 
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has bestowed on us and ends in what looks more like an out-
right declaration of war on her, programmatically proclaims:
We will take charge over our genetic programming 
and achieve mastery over our biological and neurologi-
cal processes. We will fix all individual and species 
defects left over from evolution by natural selection. 
Not content with that, we will seek complete choice of 
our bodily form and function, refining and augmenting 
our physical and intellectual abilities beyond those of 
any human in history. We (…) will not limit our physi-
cal, intellectual, or emotional capacities by remaining 
purely biological organisms. While we pursue mas-
tery of our own biochemistry, we will increasingly 
integrate our advancing technologies into our selves. 
(More 2013, 450).
This envisaged act of deliberate self-creation is what, in the 
transhumanist understanding, marks us as human. What we 
shall leave behind us by cutting all ties to Mother Nature is 
precisely everything that we have in common with nonhuman 
animals, with what is not distinctly human about us. What we 
shall leave behind, or “fix,” is, in other words, the animal in us. 
We kill the mother so that we no longer have to be her sons and 
daughters, as all the other animals continue to be. Unless of 
course we do something about it. If we accept that our lives are 
poor and unsatisfactory, that we live the life of slaves (to our 
own biology) because we are ultimately (still) animals (or per-
haps transanimals), then the lives of nonhuman animals must 
be judged the same. Severely limited in their possibilities as 
nonhuman animals are, which is even more limited than we 
are, their lives must be understood as even poorer than ours. 
While we at least have some degree of self-determination and 
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potential for self-creation, they have none. Yet if we are fixable, 
then they may be too. And since transhumanism is a philoso-
phy that officially subscribes to the view that all sentient crea-
tures deserve moral consideration and, if needed, our help and 
support, as transhumanists we have a duty to step in and not 
only fix ourselves, but also all other animals. Thus, according 
to James Hughes, we “have an obligation to children to provide 
them with education and secure homes so they can realize their 
abilities. We have an obligation to the mentally ill to provide 
them with treatments that return them to sanity. Alongside the 
provision of basic needs, education and a caring community, 
we also are increasingly able to offer technology as a means 
for people to reach their fullest potentials. (…) I think we have 
the same obligation to uplift ‘disabled’ animal citizens that we 
have to disabled human citizen.” (Hughes 2004, 224).
The sentiment is noble perhaps, but also quite patronizing. 
It is not compassion, but pity, that is being shown here, of the 
kind that we would resent if expressed towards us, because it 
always involves condescension, the presumption of superior-
ity. Poor brutes, such lowly lives they have; let us take pity on 
them and lift them up to our own lofty heights! This is a far cry 
from what Donna Haraway describes as the meeting of spe-
cies, which involves the practical recognition of the animal as 
a companion, as an equal, responsive and active partner in the 
muddy dance of life. “I am a creature of the mud, not the sky”, 
says Haraway (2008, 4). Not so the transhumanist, who decid-
edly leans towards the sky as her (and our) true home. Animals 
live in the mud, and children play in it. They know nothing of 
the sky. For Hughes, animals are like human children who are 
deficient because they have not developed their full potential 
yet. But at least children will one day grow up, nearer to the 
sky, whereas animals never will, or at least not without a little 
Michael Hauskeller
30
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 20, Issue 1
help from their friends, namely us. Animals are in a perma-
nent childlike state, which here does not signify innocence, but 
immaturity and dependence. Only we can save them from the 
misfortune of a permanent childhood. And to add insult to in-
jury, animals are also likened to the mentally ill and mentally 
disabled. Something significant is missing from their constitu-
tion, something that they ought to have but cannot acquire by 
themselves. We need to jump into the breach and help them, 
restore them to sanity.
The human is here figured as the better animal (precisely 
because we are less animal, or transanimal), just as the posthu-
man is figured as the better human (because they are less ani-
mal even more). What the posthuman is in comparison to us, we 
are in comparison to nonhuman animals. They are conceived 
as prehumans (in the same way that we are conceived, teleo-
logically or at least trajectorially, as pre-posthumans). Conse-
quently, we look after an animal’s well-being by helping it to 
become something that is no longer animal. What is good for 
the animal (be it non-human or human) is that it disappears as 
an animal. The enhancement of the animal lies in its elimina-
tion; the only good animal is an ex-animal. This is, ultimately, 
what all proposals for animal enhancement suggest. Transhu-
manist uplifting simply follows that tradition. What is different 
is merely the kind of elimination that is suggested. What it has 
in common with those other proposed ways to enhance or (dis-
enhance) animals is the determination not to let the animal be 
what nature has made it. In one way or another the unenhanced 
animal or the animal qua animal is always a nuisance. Thus 
David Pearce (1995, Section I.10), in his eagerness to free the 
world and all sentient beings in it of all suffering, outlines his 
plan to turn all carnivorous animals into herbivores or, if that 
is not possible, to get rid of them altogether. It is the transhu-
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manist version of the biblical prediction (if taken literally) of a 
coming golden age, when “the wolf and the lamb shall graze 
together; the lion shall eat straw like the ox, and dust shall be 
the serpent’s foe.” (Isaiah 65:25). Except that it is less forgiving 
and more inclusive. Cats and other carnivores, declares Pearce, 
are in fact nothing but the animal equivalent of psychopaths 
(hence insane, once again). They are “pre-programmed killing 
machines” (which, apparently, is the wrong kind of machine), 
which we should not allow to continue to exist. In fact, it is our 
moral duty to make sure that they do not exist. Any desire to 
preserve them is nothing but a “misguided romanticisation.” 
“In future,” he says, “the life-forms which exist on this planet 
will be there purely because we allow them to be so, or choose 
to create them.” Pearce realises that all this talk about allowing 
and not allowing living things to exist “smacks of hubris,” but 
he is fine with that because he thinks it is both true and right 
that this is going to happen. His fellow transhumanist and fel-
low animal rights advocate George Dvorsky shares Pearce’s 
unabashed “technovisionary paternalism” (Ferrari 2015), the 
conviction that we know best what is good for nonhuman ani-
mals, and indeed what is good and desirable in general and for 
everyone. Besides, we have the power, and with power comes 
responsibility, which we shouldn’t shy away from. Hence the 
uplift imperative. Dvorsky defines animal uplifting — a term 
borrowed from David Brin’s 1980s Uplift novels — as “the the-
oretical prospect of endowing nonhumans with greater capaci-
ties, including and especially increased intelligence” (Dvorsky 
2008, 130) and claims that we “are morally obligated to bio-
logically enhance nonhuman animals and integrate them into 
human and posthuman society” (Dvorsky 2008, 129). The as-
sumption behind the postulated “ethical imperative to uplift” 
is that a nonhuman animal’s life generally resembles more a 
Hobbesian nightmare than a Rousseauian Garden of Eden: it is 
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“nasty, brutish and short.” Also, they lack political participa-
tion and what comes with it, namely liberty and justice. By up-
lifting them to a human (or, if we also uplift ourselves, posthu-
man) level of intelligence, we would empower nonhuman ani-
mals “to participate in the broader social community” (Dvor-
sky 2008, 137) and to live “a more dignified and fulfilling life” 
(Dvorsky 2008, 132) than is currently, due to the limitations of 
their nature, available to them. Uplifting will allow both us and 
them to transcend those biological limitations. However, since 
those limitations are much more severe and inflexible for them 
than they are (normally) for us, so that they never really reach 
“minimally acceptable modes of functioning,” nonhuman ani-
mals can be “construed as disabled humans” (Dvorsky 2008, 
138). Dvorsky thus adopts and reaffirms Hughes’s disability 
narrative. The term ‘disability’ suggests not only an absence, 
but the absence of something that should be there. They lack 
something important that we have.
Despite protests to the contrary (Dvorsky 2008, 138), the 
uplift project is inherently anthropocentric. The very word 
‘uplifting’ suggests a hierarchy, a difference between lower 
and higher states of existence. We can only uplift what is on 
a lower level, and we can only do the uplifting if we are on a 
higher level already (which does not preclude the possibility of 
even higher than human levels). Dvorsky (2012) approvingly 
cites David Brin, the author of the Uplift saga and like Dvor-
sky and Hughes fellow at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging 
Technology, who in an interview accuses evolution of being 
“stingy” for not letting nonhuman animals crash through the 
“firm glass ceiling” of limited abilities under which they are 
stuck. (We on the other hand have, somehow, crashed through, 
although we may have a, somewhat less firm, glass ceiling of 
our own.) It would, he says, be selfish of us to let them stay 
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there and to keep the benefits of enhancement technologies to 
ourselves. “Imagine dolphin philosophers, bonobo therapists, 
raven playwrights and poets,” he says, “How lonely, if we turn 
away without trying.” That we might be lonely without uplifted 
animals is a curious and telling worry. It assumes that we can-
not communicate with nonhuman animals, that they live in one 
world and we in quite another. That we cannot communicate 
with them in our language (i.e. a language that we can under-
stand) is clearly perceived as frustrating. It is yet another limi-
tation imposed on us. There are worlds of experience out there 
that we cannot grasp, that are closed to us. We have no idea at 
all what it is like to be a bat. Or for that matter a dog. Uplift-
ing will change that: it will finally allow us to know what it is 
like. Except that the uplifted bat is no longer a bat, the dolphin 
turned philosopher no longer a dolphin, and the raven turned 
poet no longer a raven. Once they have been enabled to com-
municate with us in our language they are no longer the kind 
of otherworldly being that we wanted to communicate with in 
the first place. “If a lion could speak,” Wittgenstein remarked, 
“we could not understand him” (1953, 223). We will, however, 
understand the post-lion, precisely because he will no longer 
be a lion, which is just as well. With only post-animals around 
(since we will not allow any unenhanced animals to exist), we 
will no longer be constantly reminded of our limitations be-
cause there is nobody left that we cannot communicate with, 
nobody who defies our understanding and is beyond our reach, 
beyond our control. The animal is that which cannot be con-
trolled (and the animal in us, the animal that we are, is every-
thing in us that we cannot control). Giving nonhuman animals 
human-like mental abilities is a way to make them less alien 
and more compliant. The autonomy that is bestowed on them is 
a form of appropriation. Uplifting is less about giving nonhu-
man animals a mental form that finally makes them deserv-
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ing of equal moral recognition (as Hughes seems to think), but 
about giving them what they need to recognise us: as their cre-
ators, saviours and, ultimately, superiors. In Sundiver, the first 
installment of Brin’s Uplift trilogy (Brin 2012), first published 
in 1980, an argument ensues between a human and an uplifted 
chimp technician called Jeffrey. When Jeffrey gets mad and 
physically attacks the human in an ape-like fashion, another 
human, the novel’s main protagonist, a man called Jacob, in-
tervenes: “Jacob took the chimp’s face in his hands. Jeffrey 
snarled at him. ‘Chimpanzee-Jeffrey, listen to me! I am Jacob 
Demwa. I am a human being. I am a supervisor with Project 
Uplift. I tell you now that you are behaving in an unseemly 
manner… you are acting like an animal!’ Jeffrey’s head jerked 
back as if slapped.” When a chastened Jeffrey apologizes to his 
human opponent, Jacob praises him: “That’s fine,’ Jacob said. 
‘It takes a real man to apologize.’” (Brin 2012, 67) 
The ex-animal apologises for behaving like an animal. 
The uplifting process was meant to civilize and discipline it, 
and when it falls back to its animal ways it needs to be dis-
ciplined again by being reminded of its status, its precarious 
and paradoxical position as the animal-it-was-but-no-longer-is. 
It is thus not surprising that uplifting can, as Dvorsky (2012) 
acknowledges, “be construed as being imperialistic and over-
domineering — an unfair and unwarranted imposition of ‘hu-
manness’ onto the animal kingdom.” Yet Dvorsky’s concession 
that “there’s something to be said for living in an innocent state 
of mind — even if it is in the jungle” rings false. The phrasing 
betrays the same condescending attitude towards real pre-en-
hancement animals that informs the whole uplift project. The 
animal’s “innocence” is just a euphemism for an absence of 
(human-like) knowledge and understanding, which a transhu-
manist cannot but find deplorable. For the transhumanist, in-
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nocence means ignorance, and ignorance is bad. That kind of 
innocence is quite compatible with Pearce’s assessment of car-
nivorous animals as psychopaths. And the “jungle” indicates 
a nature that is red in tooth and claw, untamed, uncivilized, 
unpredictable. This jungle is clearly not a paradise. It is a place 
that we cannot imagine anyone would like to stay in if they had 
the choice to leave it. I’m an animal… get me out of here. 
So that is what transhumanists urge us to do: get the beast 
out of the jungle, make it presentable. I find myself reminded 
of a story by Franz Kafka, “Report to an Academy,” published 
almost exactly a century ago. In that story, a former ape reflects 
on his transformation from ape to human-like post-ape and ex-
plains why this transformation has occurred. Red Peter – as hu-
man society has dubbed him – lived his life as a free ape until 
he was shot and captured by hunters, who teach him how to 
drink alcohol and how to spit. He finds himself crammed into a 
small cage, made fun of, and occasionally tortured. He knows 
that even if he manages to escape it would do him no good 
because he would only be captured again. So he reasons that if 
this is the place that an ape has to live in, then there is only a 
way out for him if he stops being one, and becomes human. So 
he observes and imitates, learns to speak like a human, and to 
act like one, until he is finally human enough to be allowed to 
live a human-like life in a human world. By adopting human 
ways he has managed to survive and to get out of the cage. 
He has not, however, acquired freedom. Freedom, he says, is 
something that he perhaps had (he cannot quite remember) 
when he used to be an ape and that some humans may yearn 
for. That freedom he has not regained by submitting himself to 
“the yoke” of human civilization. 
Michael Hauskeller
36
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 20, Issue 1
This suggests that there are two different kinds of freedom. 
One is the self-regulating autonomy that characterises modern 
human life and that transhumanists seek to expand and extend 
to non-human animals, ultimately aiming at liberation from all 
biological constraints. The other is the freedom of the jungle 
that any wild animal still has and that we humans have mostly 
lost. This is the freedom to live one’s life as the kind of crea-
ture that one is, without the pressure or need to change and 
become something else. Like Kafka’s Red Peter, animals may 
only want to choose the former if they have no other way out: 
if ceasing to be what they are is the only chance they have to 
be left in peace and not to be subjected to our human needs and 
wants. 
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